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RETIREMENT PAY: A DIVORCE
IN TIME SAVED MINE
In dissolution proceedings, the classification of retirement benefits
as community or separate property presents an anomaly. Mechanically
applied rules often supplant community property principles. The Cal-
ifornia courts have forsaken the traditional notion of community contri-
bution through the expenditure of community efforts. In place of
this, the courts rely on the date that the employee spouse becomes eli-
gible to receive his pension. Until this date, the interest in the retire-
ment benefits is characterized as neither separate nor community prop-
erty. Rather, it is an expectancy-an unrecognized, unprotected prop-
erty right.' Such a classification strips the nonemployee spouse of any
interest in the retirement benefits. This interest potentially has substan-
tial value, part of which results from the investment of the marital com-
munity's time and energy. In view of this the courts should recog-
nize that the community is entitled to an apportioned share of the re-
tirement benefits if and when they mature.
Matured vs Unmatured
"Retirement benefits," for the purpose of this note, means money
received in either a lump sum or periodic payments under an employee
retirement plan which provides for payments beyond return of the em-
ployee's contributions, if any, plus interest and which conditions the
right to receive the payments upon the attainment of a certain age or
the completion of a certain period of employment or both. In some,
perhaps most, retirement plans the employee makes contributions from
his wages to the retirement fund and has a right to withdraw those con-
tributions upon termination of employment prior to retirement. Such
withdrawable employee contributions are not included in the term
"retirement benefits" as used in this note. If an employee is entitled to
withdraw his accumulated contributions upon termination of employ-
ment before retirement, such contributions are, to the extent that they
were made from wages earned during the marriage, part of the com-
munity estate. They are subject to division upon dissolution of
marriage even though the employee spouse has no right to their
1. Hoeft v. Supreme Lodge of Knights of Honor, 113 Cal. 91, 96, 45 P. 185,
186 (1896).
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immediate withdrawal.2  The division usually is made by an offsetting
allowance to the nonemployee spouse, leaving the right to receive the
contributions entirely to the employee spouse.'
The application of the California community property system in
apportioning retirement benefits in a dissolution proceeding depends
primarily on whether the employee spouse's right to retirement benefits
has matured by the time of dissolution.4 If the right has matured, it
is recognized as a community interest subject to division. The measure
of this interest is the number of years in which employment and marriage
coincided.5 This measuring process has three possible applications.
First, if the marriage existed during all years of participation in the
retirement plan, the marital community's interest is equal to the full
amount of the benefits which have matured.' Second, if the employee
spouse was actively participating in the plan before marriage but be-
came eligible to receive its benefits only after marriage, the community's
interest is only a portion of the total benefits. This portion represents
the benefits attributed to employment during marriage.7 Finally, if the
employee spouse brings a matured right into the marriage, the community
2. Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d, 32, 41 n.8, 473 P.2d 765,
770 n.8, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 66 n.8 (1970); Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d
8, 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (1962); Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 40, 94
P.2d 609, 610 (1939).
3. S. WALTZER, CALIFORNIA MARITAL TERMINATION SETTLEMENTS, § 9.53, (Cal.
Cont. Educ. Bar 1971).
4. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 469-70, 492 P.2d 13, 18, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325,
330 (1972); Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 38, 473 P.2d 765, 769,
89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 65 (1970); Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 359, 384
P.2d 649, 651, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257, 259 (1963).
Some of the confusion which surrounds the application of this rule is due to the
courts' frequent synonymous use of the terms "vested" and "matured." It is suggested
that a distinction between the two be maintained. A vested interest is not necessarily
a matured right. Vested is better used to mean that the interest an employee has in a
retirement plan is irrevocable. Matured conveys the idea that the employee's right to re-
tirement benefits is capable of immediate enjoyment; due and payable as a result of hav-
ing reached the limit of its time. Thus, an employee may have a vested interest in retire-
ment benefits although his benefits have not matured. An example is the type of plan in
which the employer is obligated to provide retirement benefits if his employee serves a
minimum of ten years with the benefits becoming payable when the employee reaches age
fifty-five. Here, the employee has a vested interest in the benefits after ten years of serv-
ice, even if his employment is then terminated, but his right will not mature until his fifty-
fifth birthday. See generally Pearson v. Los Angeles County, 49 Cal. 2d 523, 319 P.2d
265 (1957); Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11-12, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167
(1962); Houghton v. City of Long Beach, 164 Cal. App. 2d 298, 330 P.2d 918 (1958).
5. This is simply an application of the well established community law doctrine
of apportionment. See Gettman v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 865, 197
P.2d 817, 819 (1948).
6. See Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972).
7. Gettman v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 197 P.2d 817 (1948).
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has a claim to the increased value of the benefits attributable to any
additional services rendered during marriage.8
In each of these instances, a matured right is divided. On the
other hand, when the marriage is dissolved before a matured right
accrues, the marital community is denied any interest in retirement
benefits. Such a denial occurs regardless of the number of years
which the community has devoted to accumulating these benefits.
The courts simply characterize the employee spouse's right as an expec-
tancy. This expectancy is not a property right in which the community
may claim an interest. 9  Thus, the unmatured retirement benefits
are neither valued nor divided upon dissolution.
The Legacy of French v. French
The court's characterization of unmatured retirement benefits as
an expectancy and the consequent denial of any community interest
in retirement pay is traceable to French v. French.10 In that case
Maxine French claimed a share of her seaman husband's retirement
pay. At the time of the divorce seaman French had several years of
Navy duty remaining before he could apply for retirement; he had
made no contributions to any pension fund. Thus, he had no liquid
retirement interest which could be added to the list of community as-
sets. In the words of the court, "[a]t the present time, his right to retire-
ment pay is an expectancy which is not subject to division as community
property."' '"
French was cited as supporting authority for the decision in Wil-
liamson v. Williamson.'2 In that case the court of appeal denied Jeanne
Williamson any interest in the funds contributed by her husband from
his salary to his retirement plan during their marriage. Because the
husband was not eligible to retire and because the terms of his retire-
ment plan made no provision for the withdrawal of contributions, his
interest was held to be an expectancy and not a property right in which
the community could claim an interest.' 3 In holding that this ex-
pectancy existing at the time of divorce was not community property,
the court established the rule that:
pensions become community property, subject to division in a di-
vorce, when and to the extent that the party is certain to receive
some payment or recovery of funds. To the extent that payment
is, at the time of the divorce, subject to conditions which may or
8. Cf. Beam v. Beam, 10 Cal. App. 3d 973, 979, 89 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283-84
(1970); Ney v. Morgan, 212 Cal. App. 2d 891, 898-99, 28.Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1963).
9. Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962).
10. 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
11. Id. at 778, 112 P.2d at 237.
12. 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962).
13. Id. at 12, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
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may not occur, the pension is an expectancy, not subject to division
as community property.14
The California Supreme Court has acknowledged in dictum that
the Williamson rule was a correct statement of the law. 5 This rule
has been the source of inequities in the treatment of retirement pay in
marital dissolutions. Trial courts have been precluded from recognizing
the extent to which the retirement fund represents an expenditure of the
community's time and effort. In this way the possibility of apportion-
ment according to value has been eliminated. In short, the Williamson
rule has denied the nonemployee spouse any share in what may be the
community's only substantial asset-the right to unmatured retirement
benefits.
The Narrowing of the Williamson Rule
In light of the inequities arising from the Williamson rule re-
cent California decisions have narrowed its application through a two
step process. First, the existence of conditions which affect the value
of matured retirement benefits clearly has no effect on their classifi-
cation as community property. Second, if the conditions precedent
to the receipt of matured retirement benefits are entirely within the em-
ployee spouse's control, these benefits lose their expectant character
and become divisible property rights.
In Waite v. Waite,'6 the appellant asserted that the pension pay-
able under the Judge's Retirement Law should not be characterized as
community property. Judge Waite had retired while still married.
He sought to distinguish a judge's retirement pay from that of any
other public employee.' 7 This distinction was based on the fact that a
judge's pension is subject to significantly different terms. A pension
received under the Public Employee's Retirement System is paid in pre-
determined dollar amounts. In contrast to this system, a judge's
monthly retirement pay may be increased to reflect raises accorded to
active judges or decreased by his acceptance of a temporary judicial
assignment.'" For these reasons, Waite claimed that retired judges do
not enjoy an unconditional and vested right to pension benefits. How-
ever, his effort to distinguish between the plans did not persuade the
court. The retirement pay was classified as community property:
The right [to the pension] flows from the services rendered by the
14. Id. at 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
15. Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 40, 473 P.2d 765, 770, 89
Cal. Rptr. 61, 66 (1970).
16. 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972).
17. See Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 38, 473 P.2d 765, 768,
89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (1970).
18. CAL. Gov'T CODE §68543.5 (West Supp. 1972), §75072 (West 1964).
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employee during marriage; the manner of the expression of the
right does not distort it or alter its community characteristic.
... Whether a pension plan provides for fixed or variable pay-
ments, and whether adjustments occur automatically or require leg-
islation, the basic point remains that the pension serves as a remu-
neration for services rendered by the employee; if these services
were discharged during the marriage, that remuneration must com-
pose a community asset.' 9
In holding that the retirement pay was community property, Waite
clearly demonstrated that conditions affecting the payment of matured
rights have no bearing on the community nature of the pension when
these rights matured during marriage. 20  This narrowing of the Wil-
liamson rule was applied by the court of appeals in In re Karlin."' In
that case the retired spouse contended that his military retirement
payments resulted from Congressional generosity. Because Con-
gress may not appropriate new funds, these benefits were subject to
conditions which might not occur. Thus, Karlin contended that his re-
tirement payments constituted an expectancy which was not divisible
as community property. The court disregarded his arguments. His re-
tirement pay lost its expectant character the moment that he retired."
Since the right to receive this pay matured while the Karlins were mar-
ried, the benefit of that right was a valuable property interest divisible
as community property.
2 3
The second step narrowing the application of the Williamson rule
resulted from significant interpretation of Williamson itself. In Ben-
sing v. Bensing,24 an Air Force major on active duty for twenty-eight
years argued that since he had not elected to retire prior to the time
of dissolution, he had no vested right to retirement benefits. There-
fore, his retirement pay remained an expectancy in which the com-
munity could claim no interest. The court found, however, that Major
Bensing was eligible to retire after twenty years of service, which he
had completed while married. Thus, the right to retirement benefits
matured during the period of the marital community. Because of this,
the community was entitled to share in the benefits to the extent they
resulted from service during the years of marriage.2 5 Significantly
the court recognized that the right to receive retirement pay was sub-
19. 6 Cal. 3d at 471, 492 P.2d at 19-20, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 331-32.
20. Id. at 472, 492 P.2d at 20, 99 Cal.Rptr. at 332.
21. 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 101 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1972).
22. See id. at 30, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
23. The trial court awarded Mrs. Karlin a twenty-five percent interest in her hus-
band's monthly retirement pay. This figure was calculated on the basis of a fifty per-
cent community interest in the pension since the litigants had been married for eleven
of Mr. Karlin's twenty-two years of active duty. Id. at 29, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
24. 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972).
25. Id. at 891, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
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ject to a condition. That is, Major Bensing must apply for retirement.
Even though this condition was not fulfilled, the court concluded that:
the only condition to the payment of pension benefits is a condition
entirely within Major Bensing's control and this is not the type of
uncertainty which precludes division upon divorce.
[T]o accept appellant's argument would mean that a spouse
could be deprived of any share of matured pension rights by the
decision of the employee to delay retirement until after the divorce
proceedings were concluded. This would deprive respondent of her
share of the community's most substantial asset. 2"
Though Major Bensing was receiving no retirement pay, the court
devised a method to partition this presently nonexistent asset. It or-
dered a current distribution of the wife's interest in the retirement plan.
By this order, the court of appeal modified the trial court's award.
Mrs. Bensing had been awarded her share of the community's interest
in the actuarial equivalent of Major Bensing's pension. This pension
would be payable in monthly installments. In modifying the trial
court's award, the appellate court recognized that Mrs. Bensing was
not entitled to a financial interest in the pension fund which was greater
than that receivable by Major Bensing. Since the retirement payments
would terminate on his death, the actuarial value might never be
reached. Consequently, the award of a lump sum interest was stricken
and the appellate court ordered monthly payments to Mrs. Bensing
"continuing so long as both plaintiff and defendant live, but to terminate
upon the death of either."' 28
Reconciling the Law with Justice
While recent decisions have narrowed the conditions to which the
Williamson rule applies, the California courts' preoccupation with "vest-
edness" remains in derogation of community property doctrines. A more
26. Id. at 893, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
27. Id. at 895, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
28. Id. But see Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 50, 473 P.2d
765, 777, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 73 (1970), where the court said: "But in this case the
alternative, an award of the entire pension to the employee, leaves his spouse totally
destitute. In that unfortunate situation, the injustice of awarding all benefits to the
employee may leave no alternative but to permit the court to award a portion of the
pension rights to the spouse." 3 Cal. 3d at 50, 473 P.2d at 777, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
The Bensing decision was followed in Brown v. Brown, 27 Cal. App. 3d 188,
103 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1972). This case also involved a spouse on active military duty
who was eligible to retire at the time of dissolution. Evaluation of the community inter-
est, however, was remanded to the trial court since the Browns had been separated for
several years when Leroy became eligible to retire. Since property acquired by ei-
ther spouse under the circumstances of separation is the separate property of the acquir-
ing spouse, the argument is available that since the right to the retirement benefits
matured after separation, such benefits are the sole property of the employee spouse.
See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5119 (West Supp. 1972).
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substantial departure from the Williamson rule is needed. The court's
reliance on the date that the pension rights mature is inconsistent with
basic community property principles. If these basic principles were
followed, the courts would seek to measure the direct contributions of
community time and effort invested in the pension fund. 9
The effect of this failure to apply basic community property prin-
ciples is illustrated by the following hypothetical situation. Dick and Pat
have been married for eighteen years, the length of Dick's service with
his employer. Under his employment contract Dick will become en-
titled to generous employer-provided monthly retirement payments
only after he has completed twenty years of service. Claiming irrec-
oncilable differences, Dick petitions for dissolution. It is granted in
the nineteenth year of marriage. By his unilateral decision to terminate
his marriage immediately before his pension right matures, Dick has,
under the present law, effectively denied Pat any interest in a very
valuable asset. The law ignores the fact that Dick's interest in the re-
tirement fund has been purchased almost entirely by personal efforts
which are community assets.
A trial court faced with the facts of this extreme example probably
would be tempted to go through some procedural stretching to achieve
a just result. However, because most marital dissolutions are likely
to occur well before the unmatured pension benefits of the employee
spouse have significant value, the development of a fair and appropriate
solution to the problem of determining and allocating the value of these
benefits has received little judicial impetus. Yet as it relates to re-
tirement pay, the Williamson rule of expectancies is applied whether
the community has devoted thirty days or thirty years of energy and
skill towards building up retirement benefits. As long as payment of
the benefits is subject to conditions beyond the employee's control, the
pension is not considered a proper subject for the courts' disposition.
Merely because the right to retirement pay is unmatured at the time of
dissolution the trial courts are required to reject the nonemployee
spouse's claim to an apportioned share of that asset. This result is
unfair and unnecessary.
Incorporating Unmatured Retirement Benefits
into the Community Property System
To alleviate unfair results, the unmatured right to retirement bene-
fits should be treated as a valid property interest. This treatment would
preclude their classification as an expectancy incapable of readily cal-
culable apportionment between the marital partners. However, the Cal-
ifornia courts understandably are reluctant to include in the community
29. See text accompanying notes 30-31, infra.
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estate an interest which is subject to forfeiture, is contingent or is other-
wise imperfect. Evaluating and distributing such an interest is beyond
precise solution. Yet to dismiss these unmatured benefits as an im-
proper subject for the courts' disposition ignores a fundamental con-
cept of the community property system. This concept is that accumu-
lations of value which result from the expenditure of time, energy or
skill of a married person should inure to the benefit of the commu-
nity3" and each spouse should have a present, existing and equal inter-
est in this wealth.
3 1
This fundamental concept has been applied outside the area of
retirement benefits. The courts have recognized a community inter-
est in other assets of substantial, albeit only potential, value. These
assets were developed, at least in part, by the expenditure of commu-
nity owned time and effort.
For example, in Waters v. Waters,32 the attorney husband ob-
jected to a judgment awarding his wife one half interest in property he
expected to receive as a contingent fee from a client he represented
in a case which was on appeal at the time of divorce. Since whether the
husband would acquire any property could be ascertained only after
the community terminated, he argued that the court had no jurisdiction
to classify the contingency fee as community property. The court,
however, found the disposition of this uncertain asset reasonable and
proper. In making this finding, the court emphasized the fact that the
attorney expended most of his time and skill in preparing the case dur-
ing the period these assets belonged to the community:
[A] very considerable part of the ultimate compensation, if any, to
be received by defendant must be credited to the community, even
though we assume the soundness of his argument to the effect that
a portion of the fee which may be earned after the dissolution of
the marriage will be his separate property.
33
Thus, the court held that the expenditure of community assets created
a contingent community property right. This right would be appor-
tioned if and when the right becomes a certainty. If the right failed
to mature, the Waters would receive nothing.34 This logic and the con-
ditional award are equally applicable to unmatured retirement benefits.
A portion of the potential benefits are created by the expenditure of
the employee spouse's time and energy. The right to receipt matures
30. See Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 17, 490 P.2d 257, 260, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 137, 140 (1971); Somps v. Somps, 250 Cal. App. 2d 328, 332-33, 58 Cal. Rptr.
304, 307 (1967); H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 5 (2d ed. 1971).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105 (West 1970).
32. 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946).
33. Id. at 270, 170 P.2d at 498 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 270, 170 P.2d at 497.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
after dissolution. Therefore, the nonemployee spouse's interest would
be payable only when the employee spouse's rights matured. If the
retirement right never matures neither spouse will receive anything.
In addition to the Waters case, community interests have been rec-
ognized in life insurance benefits which became payable years after
the community ended. An example of such recognition is McBride v.
McBride.35 Upon the death of Mr. McBride, his former wife claimed
the benefits of a life insurance policy which had not been disposed of
when the McBrides were divorced. She was awarded an interest in the
proceeds. This award was supported by basic community property
principles. When the premiums of an insurance policy have been paid
with community funds, it is community property. Each spouse has a
valid claim to its benefits."6 When the policy is purchased partly
with community and partly with separate funds, the proceeds are appor-
tioned. This apportionment is based on the ratio of community con-
tributions to separate property contributionsI
T
McBride can provide the foundation from which unmatured re-
tirement benefits can, be incorporated into the community property
system. A life insurance policy is reasonably analogous to a retirement
plan. The proceeds of that policy are similar to matured retirement
benefits. The insurance proceeds are purchased by premium pay-
ments; the retirement benefits are purchased by expenditure of the
employee's time, energy and skill. This leads to a new rule: the com-
munity has an interest in the benefits of the retirement plan to the ex-
tent that the value of these benefits is attributable to the community
effort. The date that the benefits become payable is not the controlling
factor. It simply conditions the time for enjoyment.
Such a new rule does not eliminate valuation problems. However,
the fact that a dollar value cannot be assigned to the community inter-
est in the retirement fund at the time of dissolution should not dissuade
the court from including these benefits in the divisible community es-
tate. Scott v. Commissioner,"3 a federal tax decision, dealt specifi-
cally with a property interest which was incapable of present evalua-
tion. In that case, the deceased wife bequeathed her ownership in the
insurance policy of her husband to her sons. The policy had been pur-
chased with community funds. The husband survived the wife and
continued to make premium payments. These payments were made
35. 11 Cal. App. 2d 521, 524-25, 54 P.2d 480, 481 (1936).
36. Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Cal. 2d 799, 803, 376 P.2d 563, 566, 26 Cal. Rptr. 635,
638 (1962); Tyre v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. 2d 399, 402, 353 P.2d 725, 727, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 15 (1960).
37. Modem Woodmen of America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 733, 299 P. 754,
755 (1936).
38. 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
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from his separate funds. The court said that the sons indeed had an
ownership interest. However, the value of their mother's share could
not be ascertained until the husband died:
[B]ecause of the peculiar nature of an insurance policy, the wife's
proportional interest can either grow or diminish. It grows as more
premiums are paid from community funds; it diminishes as more
premiums are paid from the husband's separate funds.3 9
These examples of contingency fee and life insurance cases can
provide the impetus for overturning the Williamson rule. Outside the
area of retirement pay courts have been interested in the extent to which
community efforts are responsible for the development of an asset pay-
able in the future. The fact that present evaluation, present distribution
and even the guarantee of payment are precluded at the time of judg-
ment has presented no insuperable problem. In the area of retirement
benefits the California courts should also apply community property
principles.
A Proposal
The California courts can return to basic community property
principles in the division of retirement benefits in a way that is both
manageable for them and fair to the spouses. This can be accomplished
at the time of dissolution. The court simply must recognize that the
nonemployee spouse has an apportionable ownership interest 0 in the
retirement fund. This interest will mature only if and when the em-
ployee spouse becomes eligible to apply for retirement benefits. At that
time, the community interest will be distributed. Such a conditional
judgment removes from the employee spouse the risk of paying the
community for retirement benefits which may never mature.4 Notice
of the court's order would be served on the employer who then could
not make a discretionary disposition of the retirement benefits. At the
39. Id. at 160.
40. An award of an ownership interest avoids the argument that pension funds
exist for the exclusive benefit of the employee and are therefore beyond the reach of
creditors. "The recognition of an ownership claim [in the retirement fund] cannot be
described as the levy of execution, garnishment, attachment or assignment of property."
Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 44, 473 P.2d 765, 772, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 61, 68 (1970).
41. This risk would be created if the court awarded the nonemployee spouse com-
munity assets equal to one-half the actuarial value of the expected retirement benefits.
A present award to the nonemployee spouse of community assets equal to one-half the
actuarial value of the expected retirement benefits ignores the possibility that the em-
ployee spouse may never satisfy the conditions precedent to retirement. While the non-
employee spouse enjoys the equivalent of these benefits from the time of dissolution,
the employee spouse must wait until his retirement, a fact which might not occur, to
realize his share of the property division. Cf. Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d
889, 895, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255, 259 (1972).
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time of retirement eligibility, the portion of the matured retirement
benefits attributable to the period of employment during marriage could
be calculated with reasonable accuracy in compliance with the decree. 2
In some cases the courts will be able to determine a portion of
the nonemployee spouse's interest at the time of dissolution. This
is because the value of employee contributions made to the retirement
fund during the existence of the marital community is readily deter-
minable. Making such a determination does not impose any new bur-
den on the courts. The current practice is to award the nonemployee
spouse at the time of dissolution the equivalent of one-half of all with-
drawable contributions made during the marriage. 43  Any additional
interest accruing to the nonemployee spouse presumably would be based
on employer contributions. This interest would be realized when the
employee reaches retirement eligibility. A deduction necessarily would
be made for the prior award to the nonemployee spouse of his or her
share of the community contributions.
This proposed remedy is consistent with basic community prop-
erty principles and their application in the contingency fee and life in-
surance cases. The right of each spouse to the retirement benefits
would mature when the employee spouse becomes eligible to apply for
retirement benefits. The choice among alternative methods of receiv-
ing retirement benefits-that is, periodic or lump sum payment-
should remain in the employee as it would if he were still married. The
nonemployee spouse's receipt of the matured benefits would be on the
same basis as their receipt by the employee spouse. When the em-
ployee elected to retire, the employer would pay the former spouse a
calculated share. These payments would be deducted from the em-
ployee's pension. In the event that employee spouse elected not to re-
tire although eligible, the courts could fashion a decree forcing dis-
tribution to the nonemployee spouse of a proper share of the commu-
nity interest as soon as the employee spouse's right to retirement benefits
matures regardless of the choice not to retire.
44
42. Admittedly, the calculation of the value of the community interest in a retire-
ment plan would in most instances present serious practical problems for the trial judge.
Because of the many variations in the factors which make up the ultimate size of
an employee's pension check, it is suggested that this calculation be made by the em-
ployer or the administrators of the retirement plan. These are the experts with the
knowledge of the mathematical basis and working order of the plan who possess the sta-
tistical data and variables which may concern the particular employee. It should not
be a valid objection to this proposal that the evaluation of this interest is beyond mathe-
matical precision. A reasonable approximation of the amount of the nonemployee
spouse's interest should be held sufficient.
43. See text accompanying note 3, supra.
44. See, e.g., Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255
(1972).
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Thus, once the courts recognize a community property interest in
unmatured retirement benefits, the nonemployee spouse's interest can
be protected. This would be accomplished by a conditional decree.
Such a decree includes the degree of flexibility required to guaran-
tee fairness to both spouses. This fairness continues from the time of
dissolution until the retirement benefits mature.
Conclusion
As a result of recent decisions " the California community property
system now recognizes the extent of the community effort involved in
the accumulation of retirement benefits if the date of eligibility for
retirement occurs prior to the dissolution of marriage, even though at
the time of dissolution the fact of retirement remains uncertain. In light
of these recent decisions, the courts can now further vindicate the rights
of the nonemployee spouse by extending community property pro-
tection to unmatured retirement benefits. This extension would not be
inconsistent with pronouncements by the supreme court:
[W]e do not believe the Legislature has declared the employee's
right to a pension so sacrosanct that it is incompatible with his
spouse's ownership of her community share in it. Both employee
and non-employee own community property rights in the pension
fund that are of equal stature; such rights are equally subject to the
power of the divorce court. Because the employee participates in
the pension program he does not thereby strip his spouse of vested
community property rights in that fund.46
This statement shows the court's recognition that retirement benefits
are properly includable in the community property system. When such
a recognition is coupled with the logic of the contingency fee and life
insurance cases, the result is that unmatured benefits are community
property subject to apportionment and distribution upon dissolution.
Awarding the nonemployee spouse an apportioned ownership interest,
contingent upon the employee spouse's acquisition of a matured right
to retirement benefits, provides a fair and manageable solution. This
solution finds support in the fundamental principles of the community
property system.
John J. Gudebski*
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45. Brown v. Brown, 27 Cal. App. 3d 188, 103 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1972); Bensing v.
Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972).
46. Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 50, 473 P.2d 765, 777, 89
Cal. Rptr. 61, 73 (1970).
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